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Summary. In this interview, Wendy Wheeler, London Metropolitan University Emerita 
Professor of English Literature and Cultural Inquiry, discusses her thoughts on biose-
miotics and its relevance for ethics. In Wheeler’s perspective, biosemiotics can ground 
ethics because it offers an alternative and fitting ontology of relations. She shares her 
thoughts on Peirce as a foundational figure for biosemiotics, and explains why she 
doubts that an ecological ethics can be framed in terms of laws. Further, she discusses 
her views on moral agency in nonhumans, and warns against ideas based on human 
exceptionalism, sentimentalism and puritanism. Wheeler thinks that a biosemiotic ethics 
can posit a more located, or systemically nested, sense of semiotic value. Her moral 
question, she explains, would always be something like: Is this growing? Is this lively?
Zusammenfassung. In diesem Interview diskutiert Wendy Wheeler, emeritierte Pro-
fessorin der englischen Literatur- und Kulturforschung an der London Metropolitan Uni-
versity, ihre Gedanken zur Biosemiotik und deren Relevanz für die Ethik. Nach Whee-
lers Verständnis kann Biosemiotik eine Ethik begründen, weil sie eine alternative und 
angemessene Ontologie der Beziehungen bereithält. Sie erläutert ihre Gedanken zu 
Peirce als einer der Gründungsfiguren der Biosemiotik und erklärt, warum sie an der 
Möglichkeit einer gesetzlichen Rahmung der ökologischen Ethik zweifelt. Darüber hin-
aus diskutiert sie ihre Ansichten zur Möglichkeit moralischen Handelns in nicht-mensch-
lichen Organismen und warnt vor Konzepten, die auf menschlicher Ausschließlichkeit, 
Sentimentalität und Puritanismus basieren. Wheeler ist der Auffassung, dass biosemi-
otische Ethik ein stärker eingegrenztes, oder systemisch geschachteltes Konzept von 
semiotischem Wert postulieren kann. Ihre moralische Frage, so erklärt sie, würde stets 
in etwa so lauten: Wächst es? Ist es lebendig?
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I.
JB: Thinking about contemporary changes to the directions of animal and 
environmental ethics in the era of the Anthropocene and age of ecology, 
what strategies or theoretical frameworks do you think have the most poten-
tial for solving applied ethical problems involving nonhuman animals or 
nature?
WW: Biosemiotics and an ontology of semiotic relations, obviously!
JB:  But what about biosemiotics gives it potential? It seems like there are 
still many conceptual and structural problems to solve before biosemiotics 
becomes more widely accepted and impactful. And what’s so important 
about an ontology of relations? Why not just describe scientifically the ways 
things do indeed relate “out there” in nature and leave ontology and con-
ceptual schemata aside?
WW: As it is currently practiced (on the model of physics and reductionism), 
science, which only deals with material particulars, cannot – as I argue in 
my chapter on the influence of gnosticism on modern science in Expecting 
the Earth – offer us an account of relations at all. Neither can it offer us an 
account of immaterial causes, such as semiotic causes, of which relations 
are the prime example. The Latins knew it. Charles Sanders Peirce (who 
read them) knew it. Gregory Bateson (who read Peirce) knew it. Biosemi-
otics knows it. I think it’s a good idea to stay as close to science as possi-
ble. Jesper Hoffmeyer’s work is an excellent example of this, as is Terry 
Deacon’s. However, and as wonderful and orientated to the facts of the case 
as it is, science always has more to do. I take Peirce’s model of science as 
“the Path of Inquiry” here. Thus I do, as a matter of fact, think that the sci-
entific approach is radically inclined to bring us closer to the truth of the 
case, but – as is well known by philosophers of science – science is not 
wholly separable from the culture in which it has grown. 
For example, in Western cultures, both science and political formations 
are profoundly influenced – in ways they do not even discern – by the Chris-
tianity in which these cultures have been born. Paul Davies makes this argu-
ment in his chapter in Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics 
to Metaphysics. Hilaire Belloc makes a similar case, in his The Great Here-
sies, for understanding the whole cultural significance of heresies in the 
shaping of human self-understanding and its practice in terms of political 
goals. And this is so even where the heresies concerned do not (as they 
generally don’t) know that they spring from heresies born centuries before 
them. Sometimes, in order to progress, science must shake itself up. For 
that, new conceptual schemata, and a different grasp of the ontology of all 
living organisms as interpretive makers of their worlds, not as machines 
but as a kind of living poetry (as biologist James A. Shapiro has put it also), 
must take place. Biosemiotics is a part of that shaking up.
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II.
JB: In your 2006 book The Whole Creature: Complexity, Biosemiotics and 
the Evolution of Culture, you recognize the biosemiotic thesis that semio-
sis is “built into nature, and we are the animals in whom it has most richly 
flourished, and who have moved from what we call nature to what we call 
culture – though they are differences only of gradation in the direction of 
complexity and conceptual abstraction” (p. 153). Do you see this ontologi-
cal view as catalyzing the conception of a biosemiotic ethic? If so, how? 
How does this differ from standard anthropocentric readings of ethics?
WW: In my recent monograph, Expecting the Earth: Life|Culture|Biosemiotics, 
I emphasise that semiotics (and biosemiotics of course) involves an onto-
logy of (sign) relations. How we conceptualise other non-human organisms, 
and our human selves among them, seems to me to be at the heart of a 
pragmaticist ethics. Once we understand our interdependence in these 
terms, as the necessary co-evolutionary co-dependence of life that flows 
cybernetically around and through other life, I think we must eventually learn 
that life is made of trillions of conversations between the living and the dead 
and the yet to be born. Especially via such ecological matters as the forms 
of microbiota, and the many things we are only just beginning to under-
stand, but upon which all our nonhuman and human lives depend, such as 
the richness of bacterial and genetic horizontal transfer, and the flows of 
which we cannot calculate. This will certainly make us develop new ethical 
principles. This makes a dialogic approach central. But, of course, a semi-
otic pragmaticist understanding recognises that dialogue isn’t only, or even 
mainly, in words. It is in the differences dialogue brings about. Impoveris-
hed diversity means fewer ‘conversations’. The fewer such ‘conversations’ 
there are, the more we are in danger of what Ivar Puura called semiocide: 
the collapse of ecological systems both natural and then cultural.1 
JB: I hear bits of C.S. Peirce coming through in your very specific use of 
“pragmaticist” in describing ethics – of course, although he grounds much 
contemporary theory, Peirce himself was no biosemiotician. Indeed, it’s not 
clear that he thought reconceptualizing non-human organisms was an 
important part of pragmaticism’s project. What’s your read on the impor-
tance of Peircean pragmatism, specifically? 
I could hazard a guess, in answer to my own question: you talk beauti-
fully in terms of the trillions of conversations about what others see as eco-
logical relations and what Peirce saw as the endless process of semiosis: 
is this the sort of thing from which new ethical principles might develop? If 
so, what might they look like (the million dollar question!)?
WW: I think that Peirce did think about non-human semiosis, and that he 
thought it was important. There’s the letter to Lady Victoria Welby of Decem-
ber 1908 (EP2.478), isn’t there, in which he defines the sign in terms of 
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relations, and complains about the confusion made between “interpreter” 
and “interpretant”. The latter word has been chosen because he doesn’t 
want to imply that interpretation is only a human accomplishment. As we 
now know from the scientific work of biosemioticians (and many others), 
interpretance is a vital capacity of all organisms, right down to bacteria and 
cells. Indeed, semiosis (sign use) may define life itself. In the letter he talks 
about the relations between interpretant and object as one in which the lat-
ter mediates the former as much as it determines (although not perhaps in 
an entirely strict sense) an “effect upon a person”. He then goes on imme-
diately to say that his insertion of “upon a person” is “a sop to Cerberus, 
because I despair of making my own broader conception understood”. In 
other words, he doesn’t think that only persons use signs and develop inter-
pretants. At this point in the early 20th century, and although Peirce had 
talked about the entire universe being perfused with signs and interpreta-
tion, he knew that suggesting that animals and plants and other organisms 
were active users of signs would be unthinkable for most scientifically inc-
lined people. In the 1906 essay “The Basis of Pragmatism in the Normati-
ve Sciences”, Peirce noted:
It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave 
its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenome-
non lies in the fact that the entire universe, – not merely the universe of existents, 
but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as part, the univer-
se which we are accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth’, – that all this universe is per-
fused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.
Now, this might seem at first blush a little different from the focus of the prag-
maticist idea, but I don’t think it is really. An understanding of sign use, and 
the relational biosemiotic ecology of the living, may give us a strong clue 
about what a biosemiotic ethics might look like. First, the meaning of something 
is what it does, what it achieves or how it functions. Thus the “meaning” of 
legs is “the capacity for walking, running, hopping, and so on”. The context 
will supply the nuance, and we should really notice the teleological aspect 
also. Pragmaticism is about what can, and is likely to, be achieved or done 
in our most realistic assessments of any actual case of sign use. This is 
close to Merleau-Ponty’s sense of phenomenological being not simply as 
an “I think” divorced from always active bodies, but, more pragmatically, as 
an “I can”. This has a distinctly pragmatic and also ethical implication. I some-
times think we humans allow ourselves to be overly distracted by words. Yet, 
if you want to know the meaning of something, you must ask what it is actu-
ally and pragmatically likely to achieve. People are very good at providing 
justifications and confabulations for things they have said. But the real meaning 
of a meaning lies in how it is likely pragmatically to function. I wish this ques-
tion was more frequently asked of people agitating for this or that cause, 
including politicians and other policy makers. Thus I am interested in an 
ethics built around what can be, and is likely to be, achieved. I’m not inte-
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rested in any puritanism of “you must” or “we must” that has not asked itself 
some serious questions, given everything we know about humans and other 
organisms, about what e f f e c t s  are likely to be brought about by this or 
that injunction. Ethical behaviour, like political policies, surely owes us all the 
respect of asking what will be brought about by a rule, law or policy. 
Second, I’m not at all sure that an ecological ethics can be framed pri-
marily in terms of law at all. In Peirce’s schema, this would be putting the 
cart before the horse. The Peircean categories, its order of being, is as fol-
lows: aesthetics (Firstness: feeling), from which springs ethics (Second-
ness: resistance and counter resistance, the struggle of enworlded being), 
followed by the taking of habits (Thirdness) which importantly include the 
necessary habits of communication. Law is one way of describing habit, 
but it may not be the most helpful one, not least because habits of commu-
nication grow organically, while modern (at least) ideas of law, as regards 
ethics, can simply be imposed – supposedly rationally, as though conscious 
reasoning is all there is to be said about knowing. I am much more interes-
ted in this way of thinking the organic emergence of life and its capacities 
than in the enunciation of desirable laws which may be very narrow, or just 
an historically circumscribed way of claiming “virtue positions”. The latter 
are often really just ‘positional goods’, i.e., about the selves making them 
and not about others at all. Human abstract thought is a wonderful thing, 
but sometimes it simply runs amok because its forgets that it is tied, by the 
chains of semiosis you mention, to all our (and other organisms’) other 
semiotic relations – aesthetics, ethics, habit – in an emergent process. I 
sometimes despair at human stupidity. Do I think that a better understan-
ding of the perfusion of semiosis, and of a pragmatic understanding of sign 
use, would improve things? Yes, I do. I have more to say about this, but I 
will wait until answering your question 4.
III.
JB: Your work seems to support the view that some animals, based on their 
capacities and practices, have moral agency; and that, as a result, we human 
animals have ethical obligations to them. What, in your view, is necessary 
to catalyze a biosemiotic ethics sufficient both (a) to acknowledge that some 
nonhuman animals have moral agency and (b) to evidence human moral 
obligations toward them? How does this view reflect a biosemiotic thesis?
WW: I think it’s simply remarkable that we, as a species, have managed to 
hang on for so long to the idea that animals (and even plants, albeit stran-
gely and slowly and through their root systems and symbiosis with fungi) 
don’t have intentional experience. Does anyone who has a pet, or works 
with animals (except in the most alienated, factory farming way) actually 
believe this? I am not sentimental about life, or about nature generally – 
which is tough and harsh – but it seems clear to me, not least for the prag-
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maticist reasons I gave above, that we have a general obligation, as thought-
ful and reflective animals, to be responsive to the life around us. “Respon-
sive” shares the same root meaning as responsible. It is true that “no man 
is an island, each is a part of the maine” as John Donne said in one of his 
devotions in 1623. “If a clod bee washed by the sea, Europe is the less”. 
We could rewrite that to say, rather less poetically, that no form of life is an 
island. Jesper Hoffmeyer has suggested that we might think of a sort of hie-
rarchy of moral regard based on the idea of ‘semiotic freedom’. I think that 
is, in fact, generally how we function; we are less worried about treading 
on ants (not much semiotic freedom) than on dogs or cats (quite a lot of 
semiotic freedom). Ethologists have showed us that some animals also 
have a sense of fairness. I like the film of a monkey hurling away a piece of 
inferior food, a carrot perhaps, when she or he sees that the monkey next 
door has been ‘paid’ a grape (far superior) for accomplishing an identical 
task. I think – and I don’t want to anthropomorphise beyond the bounds of 
sympathetic reason – that some animals will also help other animals when 
they’re in trouble. I think we can be responsive to all life forms, and particu-
larly careful perhaps with those in which we recognise a primitive sense of 
moral agency and fellow feeling. All these things are based on a biosemi-
otic recognition of forms of intentionality and agency, however moderate.
IV.
JB: Where do you see the demarcation line for a biosemiotic ethics, with 
regard to attribution of moral status? Higher mammals? Animals generally? 
Species, ecosystems? Life itself? Indeed, in the contemporary philosophi-
cal ethics literature there seems to be a resurgent interest in the moral value 
of life itself as the limit of moral extensionism. What missteps, if any, do you 
see this naturalistic extensionism making? 
WW: I think what is to be avoided is sentimentalism, which is the cloying 
side of Puritan cultures profoundly affected by the Protestant Reformation 
such as ours. I would certainly say that all life is properly worthy of our 
regard and care, but I wouldn’t understand care to exclude hunting or meat 
eating, or to involve hurting or otherwise punishing human animals for being 
the animals humans are. I can’t bear the repulsive obsession with ‘purity’ 
and ‘virtue’ that one sees all over the place in various cultures these days. 
It’s a form of religious fundamentalism. Green puritan fundamentalism is 
just as repulsive as any other kind. It’s important to stay with the science, 
and not to be distracted by quasi-religious impulses. I do, in fact, think that 
reverence for the miracle of life, a sort of cosmic consciousness, is an impor-
tant aspect of ecological thinking. I just prefer it to know what it is. I heard 
one biologist describe life as a great conductorless orchestra. One can be 
deeply moved by the music of creation without becoming sentimental or 
idealising or anthropomorphicising other organisms.
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JB: It is clear from what you said about Hoffmeyer’s idea of semiotic free-
dom that all life – even plants – are owed s o m e  moral regard based on 
their biologically/culturally bounded capacity for entering into semiotic rela-
tions with others. But, Western philosophy at least has understood moral 
status as something special: based on a capacity or characteristic that binds 
us i n  t h e  s a m e  w a y  w e  a r e  b o u n d  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  to that 
individual. Even the sentience theorist, who posits moral regard owed based 
on the individual’s abilities, holds that causing suffering to a human or non-
human is equally wrong. But what you posit is not that sort of thing: it’s a 
moral status that extends different care to different individuals based on 
how semiotically free they are. And that view seems to want to include hun-
ting as analogous to punishment for human animals: a suffering we cause 
for morally-acceptable reasons based on some unethical action on the part 
of the sufferer. So let me push just a little: do you see biosemiotics ethics 
as radically different in that it extends care in the ways you’ve described, 
or is it instead more like sentience theory which proposes some form of 
stopping place for “full” moral regard?
WW: I think I may have been less than clear on the hurting and punishing 
human animals point. I meant that we are animals, and I can’t see any intel-
lectual clarity (whether in radical animal liberation or in human abortion 
debates) in hurting one kind of animal because it has made choices (no 
matter how much one may disagree with them) in regard to another living 
thing – whether lab rat or foetus. On your other points, as I said, in practi-
ce we do make hierarchical distinctions (bacteria, ants, chickens, horses, 
dogs). Trying to eliminate that seems to me to put yourself on a hiding to 
nothing. Nothing will be achieved because the alternatives fail to take prag-
matic account of how human animals are actually inclined to behave, albeit 
within naturally and culturally shaped parameters – i.e. there is certainly 
room for movement, but those histories and umwelten are r e a l  makers 
of their organisms, and can’t just be excised or reasoned away. 
But there’s a more fundamental point I should make about how I think 
about a biosemiotic ethics. This is that the nature and extent of semiotic 
freedom cannot be unhooked from umwelt, from context that is, and from 
the whole ecology of biosemiotic relations upon which life is dependent. 
Our Western cultures are highly individualistic, but I think that a biosemi-
otic ethics would posit a more l o c a t e d , or at least systemically nested, 
sense of semiotic value. The Australian eco-philosopher Freya Mathews is 
very useful here. Freya wrote a very good article, “The Anguish of Wildlife 
Ethics” for the journal New Formations no. 76 in August 2012.2 In it, she 
noted the distinction and tension between animal ethics and ecological 
ethics. Basically, this tension exists between the valuing of animals as indi-
viduals versus valuing the whole ecological system in which it might be 
necessary for humans to take on the systemic responsibility for culling, pre-
dating or otherwise killing individual animals in order to maintain the health 
of the system as a whole. This is particularly the case where humans (sheep 
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farmers in Australia provide Freya’s example) have got rid of the top natu-
ral predator (dingoes) of another species (kangaroos) in order to protect 
their sheep herds. This alternative ecological ethics is not really suscep-
tible to context-free, supposedly individualistic rationalist utilitarian argu-
ments. The American environmental philosopher Baird Callicott opposed 
this individualistic rationalist ethic to Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, for examp-
le. The latter, of course, is concerned with the health of whole systems. 
Callicott called the rationalist system “moral individualism” and the whole 
system regarding view (one that, note, has the aesthetic noticing of sig-
nificant patterns in the system for making judgements about its best beha-
viours and preferred ways of autopoiesis) “moral holism”. This view – which 
begins with aesthetics (Firstness) as distinct from the rationalist one which 
begins with law (Thirdness) – places moral value on whole systems of 
relations and upon context. Thus, one cannot generalize about species, 
and individual members don’t matter so much as the overall eco-system. 
Species which might be highly valued in one umwelt may not be valued 
in another. 
This view seems to me to be supported by a biosemiotic systems view 
of relations. Freya discusses this whole system ecological ethic in some 
detail in her essay, and then goes on to enlarge upon this theme by dra-
wing a distinction between a x i a l  and d e o n t i c  normative ethical con-
ceptions. I think it would be testing the boundaries of the Q and A form to 
go into the detail of these arguments here, but I recommend Freya’s artic-
le for reference. These arguments are very interesting from a biosemiotic 
perspective, especially since they take an implicitly semiotic point of view 
on the constitution of the individual organism – not as a possessor of essen-
tial qualities, but rather, as the bearer of semiotic capacities which are acti-
vated or opened up by the species’ umwelt. This is at one with a biosemi-
otic view of all selves and minds. These arise, themselves on the structure 
of the sign, from the relation between a body with a memory capacity and 
a world. Selves and minds are not t h i n g s , but r e l a t i o n s . This would 
also be a part of the motor of evolutionary change. Biosemiotics shares its 
dislike of “interiority” with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and its under-
standing of the processes of potentialities becoming actualities with Gilbert 
Simondon’s ideas of “dephasing” and “individuation”. 
Axial ethics belong to civilizations developing during the great Axial 
Age (roughly 900 to 200 B.C.). Deontic ethics belong to an earlier hunter-
gatherer period. As Freya writes, discussing Australian aboriginal deon-
tological ethics by way of an example, here “law” is not “law” in the Axial 
sense of rationally arrived at, and equally true at all times for every “indi-
vidual” that falls under its remit of rational and proper empathy or fellow 
feeling. With this, you do not run into the problem of a hierarchy of what 
is really a false and unsustainable empathy in which we cry for the suffe-
ring of ants or microbes as a matter of course on every occasion. Thus 
Freya writes:
185Interview on biosemiotic ethics with Wendy Wheeler
Law is not ethics in the axial sense. It is not a practice of empathy attuning us to the 
feelings of others as individuals and thereby instilling in us a compassionate con-
cern to promote their interests and protect them from suffering. Law is ontological: 
it identifies the patterns in things that enable the living cosmos to renew and re-arti-
culate itself in perpetuity. Law furthermore spells out how people can participate in 
this pattern. It emphasizes that it is the living cosmos that has given people exis-
tence and it details what people owe the cosmos in return, what they need to do – 
ought to do – to ensure that this generative order is perpetuated. Law is in this sense 
deontic rather than ethical – it is about duty and obligation, setting out an order of 
grave imperatives that transcend compassion (Mathews 2012: 125).
I think this is profoundly biosemiotic. But it may be important to meld it to 
the hierarchy of semiotic freedom. I don’t think we can escape the position 
of judgement and some mastery in which we humans find ourselves. You 
can see why Heidegger named Dasein as the shepherd of being. I certain-
ly do want to value individual humans, or orangutans or apes or dogs or 
horses more than I value individual house flies. Decisions made about how 
humans fit into the pattern raise the question of what counts as a reasona-
ble model of the holistic pattern. This is a very difficult question. Get it wrong, 
and you have totalitarianism and the willed death of millions under Natio-
nal Socialism. On the other hand, the constant evocation of compassion as 
a source of law in our culture is a problem. The political left is predicated 
upon it constantly, but it is a heaven on earth which can never be achieved. 
It is in fact inhuman. It has also led, as we know from the politics of the 
twentieth century particularly, but also from earlier, to utterly inhuman beha-
viour and the killing of millions of human animals. The moral holism of regar-
ding what Gregory Bateson called “the patterns which connect” the whole 
system and their necessary maintenance in a living cosmos seems more 
preferable, but the ethical biosemiotic model for this will require a lot of very 
careful thinking. I am not, of course, arguing against fellow feeling; but the 
constant demand for feeling, for the right amount of feeling and for the right 
causes, is both open to abuse and also inhumanly exhausting. It is a demand 
to be a saint. It is a humanism turning into the inhuman. Perhaps I should 
add that, of course, all this needs to be argued through, subjected to objec-
tions and thus refined. The “Path of Inquiry” must remain open.
V.
JB: Biosemiotics offers a theoretical frame to distinguish living organisms 
from abiotic nature, given that it postulates that all living beings relate to 
meaning via signs of some form. Several contemporary scholars have asked 
whether and in what way this biological and semiotic theory might help jus-
tify the attribution of moral value to all (and only) living organisms and sys-
tems. Do you see naturalistic justifications for moral worth such as this as 
fruitful avenues of inquiry?
Jonathan Beever, Morten Tønnessen and Yogi Hale Hendlin 186
WW: I’ve complicated matters in my new book by extending aesthetic then 
moral value to anything which, in the hands and minds of the living, remains 
itself alive, and is capable of growth. Thus, I write about art and technolo-
gy (as long as they are living and growing) as having a life in culture just 
as organisms have a life in culture and nature. My biosemiotic and Peirce-
an criteria are lifefulness and the capacity for growth – especially the growth 
of knowledge, although I don’t think that is simply a cerebral affair by any 
means. By this reckoning, a village or a city is like a living organism. So is 
(at best) an economy. I don’t want to break culture from nature. I think we 
would do much better, and act with moral care, if we extended our sense 
of what constitutes that striving quality of living things. My moral question 
would always be something like: is this growing? Is this lively? But I would 
also want to bear in mind the important point that Jesper Hoffmeyer, and 
Terry Deacon especially, in his 2012 monograph Incomplete Nature: How 
Mind Emerged from Matter, make about the need for constraints. Various 
forms of boundaries and natural and cultural prunings are also necessary 
to lifefulness, as is an extension of our understanding of mind and of being 
as including a shaping relation to and from the natural and social environ-
ment. Invasive species may be very lively, but also may wreak environmen-
tal havoc. I think we’ve done some absolutely pathological developmental 
things (with our children, for example) because we haven’t properly under-
stood that flourishing requires both constraints and an umwelt which is the 
source of semiotic legibility. The implications of this for humans may prove 
very difficult, exceptionally hard to discuss; but we must be able to discuss 
them, and to think them through, or else there will be ecological, natural 
and social, chaos. I think we are already seeing this socially and politically. 
Attending to the experience of environments and organisms under pressu-
re by attending to the semiotic relationships within them cannot exclude 
humans. Failure to have these aesthetic, ethical and political conversations 
will only lead to more profound and destructive perturbation.
Notes
1 Cf. Puura (2013) and Maran (2013).
2 https://www.lwbooks.co.uk/sites/default/files/nf76_09mathews.pdf
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